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ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTATOR'S DECLABATIONS
OF INTENTION
LNTRODUCTION
Evidence is one of the most basic facets of legal endeavor, and
contests involving the interpretation of wills give rise to a great
deal of litigation. Combining the two premises, one reaches the
conclusion that the admissibility of evidence in cases involving
the construction of wills is of peculiar importance. This is but-
tressed by the obvious fact that the intention of the testator
regarding his testamentary dispositions can no longer be gath-
ered from him, and the only remaining sources are evidence con-
tained in the words of the will and evidence which arises outside
of the will.
One of the most troublesome types of such extrinsic evidence
is the declarations of intent made by the testator prior to, con-
current with, or subsequent to the execution of the will. This
class of extrinsic evidence is the subject of this article.
THEs OBm=c or CoxsTRucTi o
To do substantial justice to a discussion of the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence, it is necessary to set out the exact reason for
which the evidence is sought to be admitted. The object of con-
struction is to establish the intention of the testator: what his
intention was when he wrote the words which constitute his will
and what disposition of property he intended to accomplish by
those words. An excellent statement of this rule was made by
the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Rogers v. Rogers1 to
the effect that the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain
the intention of the testator and to put it into effect unless it
contravenes some well-settled rule of law.
The intention of the testator refers to the intent the words in
the will indicate; their sense or meaning as opposed to any sug-
gestion of volition of the testator.2 Further, the intention of the
testator which an action for interpretation seeks to determine is
the intention expressed by the words in the will, not what the
1. 221 S.C. 360, 366, 70 S.E.2d 637, 640 (1952). See also Bettis v. Harrison,
186 S.C. 352, 195 S.E. 835 (1938) ; 95 C.J.S. Wills §591 (1957).
2. MacDonald v. Fagan, 118 S.C. 510, 523, 111 SE 793, 796 (1922); see
also 9 WIGMoR, EvmmCE § 2472 (3d ed. 1940).
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testator had in mind and did not express or what he meant to
8ay.3 South Carolina is in accord with this proposition.
4
GE.ERAL RuLE- OF ADmissIBILITY OF ExTRINsIC Evmc
It follows from the fact that the testator's intention is to be
determined from the words used in the will that no extrinsic evi-
dence may be introduced to show what his intention was. This
general rule is followed by all American jurisdictions.5 It is
merely a statement of the parol evidence rule which forbids the
admission of parol evidence to vary or contradict the terms of a
written document.
The reasons behind the rule are not complex. A will may be
viewed as an integrated document. It represents the final prod-
uct of the testator's thoughts, his notes and the thoughts and per-
suasiveness of those around him as well as of the draftsman. To
be sure, the ingredients of the written will existed before the
actual writing, but they were mingled with other thoughts and
irrelevant ideas, both expressed and unexpressed. The written
will represents the selection of ideas from the mass which em-
body its net effect. The will, alone, represents the testator's
intention.6 Once the act has been placed into one instrument
which represents the testator's will, all other utterances on that
topic are immaterial for the purpose of determining what are
the terms of the act.7
From this, it can easily be seen that once the testator has ex-
pressed his intention in his written will, only those words which
he used may be looked to in order to determine his intent. No
extrinsic utterance may be brought in to bear on the question.
The words of the will are supreme.
EXCEPTION TO Gnimr.AL RU=E IN CAsE. OF AmBiGurrY iN Tim WILL
Every rule must have its exceptions, and the rule forbidding
the admission of extrinsic evidence to throw light on the intent
of the testator is no different, in that respect, from other rules.
3. Annot., 94 A.L.R. 17, 257 (1935) ; accord, 95 CJ.S. Wills § 591 (1957).
4. 4 Rich. Eq. 447 (S.C. 1852) ; see also Dozier v. Able, 241 S.C. 358, 128
S.E.2d 682 (1962) ; Renneker v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 20 S.C. 219 (1893);
Holbrook v. Gaillard, Riley's Eq. 167 (S.C. 1837).
5. 9 WiGmoaE, EvDENcE § 2425 (3d ed. 1940); see also Annot, 94 A.L.R.
17, 257 (1935).
6. 9 WIGMUoa, EVIMN E § 2425 (3d ed. 1940).
7. Ibid.
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The only instances in which extrinsic evidence may be used
occur when there is an ambiguity in the words of the will."
Ambiguities are of two types, patent and latent,9 and the rules
of admissibility differ with regard to each type.
South Carolina recognizes the distinction and describes a
patent ambiguity as one which arises on the face of the will.' °
A latent ambiguity, on the other hand, is defined as one which
arises when the words of the will are applied to the object or
subject which they describe."
With regard to a latent ambiguity, the rule is that extrinsic
evidence may be introduced to clarify such an ambiguity.12 In
the case of a patent ambiguity, however, it has been said that
"parol evidence is inadmissible to explain a patent ambiguity in
a will."'' 3 This may be an unfortunate statement of a general
rule which does not draw an analytical distinction that perhaps
should be made. A more correct statement might be that extrinsic
evidence may be admitted to resolve a patent ambiguity where
it cannot be resolved from the face of the will or by rules of
construction, but could be resolved by the use of extrinsic evi-
dence. This, however, is not the stated rule, though it may be
followed in practice.
8. Foreign Mission Bd. of So. Baptist Convention v. Gaines, 42 F. Supp. 85
(E.D.SC. 1942) ; Rogers v. Morrell, 82 S.C. 402, 64 S.E. 143 (1908) ; Reynolds
v. Reynolds, 65 S.C. 390, 43 S.E. 420 (1903).
9. Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S.C. 454, 58 S.E. 420 (1907).
10. [A]mbiguities, however, are patent and latent; the distinction being that
in the former case the uncertainty is one which arises upon the words of
the will, deed, or other instrument as looked at in themselves, and before
any attempt is made to apply them to the object which they describe,
while in the latter case the uncertainty arises, not upon the words of the
will, deed, or other instrument as looked at in themselves, but upon those
words when applied to the object or subject which they describe.
Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S.C. 454, 456, 58 S.E. 420, 421 (1907).
11. Ibid.
12. Foreign Mission Bd. of So. Baptist Convention v. Gaines, 42 F. Supp. 85
(E.D.S.C. 1942). Extrinsic evidence has been admitted to resolve a latent
ambiguity in South Carolina cases relating to the identity of a legatee whether
an individual, a charity or a corporation, Gaines, mpra; inaccuracy of designa-
tion or description, Gaines, supra; words of doubtful import and the particular
land in question, Perry v. Morgan, 1 Strob. Eq. 8 (S.C. 1846) ; and a case of
a legacy made to depend on a test outside of the will, Pell v. Ball, Speer's Eq.
48 (S.C. 1843). For a judicial enumeration, see Hall v. Hall, 2 McCord's Eq.
269 (S.C. 1827).
13. Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S.C. 454, 58 S.E. 420 (1907) ; Donald v. Denby,
2 McMul. 123, 130 (S.C. 1841); Holbrook v. Gailard, Riley's Eq. 167 (S.C.
1827).
[Vol. 17
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Tm TYPEs OF ExTxsio EVIDENCE AvAnTI
TO Am IN TmE CONSTRUCTION OF A WILL
Generally, extrinsic evidence is divided into two types; and
for purposes of this article, these types will be designated as
"indirect" and "direct." Indirect refers to evidence which is
admitted to explain the meaning of the words used by the testator
in his will; the circumstances surrounding the testator at the
time of the making of the will and his comments which do not
show his intent directly. It shows the intention of the testator,
or the meaning of the words he used, circumstantially. For
example, where there is ambiguity as to the identity of the bene-
ficiary, the testator could be quoted as saying, "I am fond of X,"
to show that he meant the words in his will to give property to
X. But if the will gave property to Y, the statement of the testa-
tor could not be used to show that he intended the property to
go to X, as there is no ambiguity in the language of the will.
On the other hand, direct evidence refers to statements by the
testator that directly indicate what he intended when he wrote
his will. For example, the testator could not be quoted as saying,
"I hope X will like the house I am going to give her," to show
that the words of the will were meant to give the house to X.
(This assumes the absence of an equivocation.) 14
In other words, evidence which is ancilliary only to a right
of understanding of the words to which it is applied, and which
is therefore simply explanatory of the words themselves, is in-
direct, while evidence which shows what the testator intended to
write, is direct.' 5 This distinction is recognized and accepted by
most American jurisdictions,"0 including South Carolina. 1'7
Is the distinction valid? The first argument that it is lies in
the fact that virtually every jurisdiction makes the distinction.',
Aside from that, the second-and basic-reason for drawing the
distinction between the types of extrinsic evidence is the differ-
ence in the degree of danger which is inherent in the admission
of each type. By "danger" is meant the danger of having a for-
14. Annot., 94 A.L.R. 17, 55 (1935).
15. Id. at 258.
16. Compare 95 C.J.S. Wills § 591, vith 95 CJ.S. Wills § 401 (1957); see
also 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2470, 2471 (3d ed. 1940); Annot, 94 A.L.R. 17,
258 (1935).
17. McCall v. McCall, 4 Rich. Eq. 447 (S.C. 1852); accord, Clarke v.
Clarke, 46 S.C. 230, 24 S.E. 202 (1896); Schoppert v. Gilliam, 6 Rich. Eq. 83
(S.C. 1835).
18. Annot., 94 A.L.R. 17, 258 (1935).
1965]
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mally executed writing nullified, or varied, by an informal, un-
attested testamentary declaration. In the case of indirect evi-
dence, which merely shows the testator's intent circumstantially,
the danger of giving effect to an informal statement of intent
is much less than when dealing with a direct declaration of such
intent.
ADmSsmLIT or DIRECT EvmEwCE
The general rule of exclusion of extrinsic evidence in actions
for the construction of a will is subject to an exception which
allows extrinsic evidence in the case of an ambiguity. This ex-
ception is itself subject to an exception which excludes direct
evidence of the testator's intent.
General Rule Regarding Admissibility of Direct Evidence
The question sought to be answered on construction is: What
is the meaning of the words used by the testator in his will ? 9
As pointed out above, extrinsic evidence is admissible or inad-
missible according to its bearing on the issue which this question
raises. 20 The general rule, though not without exceptions, is:
Evidence of declarations by the testator is not admissible to aid
in the construction of a will.
21
Among the various types of circumstantial evidence which are
admissible in interpreting a will, there is one forbidden variety:
expressions of intention dealing with the subject of the specific
document.22 The South Carolina position is in conformity with
the general rule. In Pell v. Ball,23 an effort was made to admit
into evidence a memorandum book kept by the testator subse-
quent to the making of his will in order to show what he intended
to pass by a clause in his will. The evidence was excluded on the
grounds that since the requirements for the execution of a will
were set forth in a statute, that the only competent evidence was
the written document, and direct evidence of intent was to be
excluded.2 4
19. Id.; see also Wheeler v. Dunlap, 13 Ky. (B. Mon.) 291 (1952); 95
CJ.S. Wills § 591 (1957).
20. McCall v. McCall, 4 Rich. Eq. 447 (S.C. 1852); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 17,
258 (1935), citing: WGRAm, RuLEs OF LAW IN INTEPRETATION OF WILLS,
53-4 (3d ed. 1840).
21. Annot., 94 A.L.R. 17, 263 (1935).
22. 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2471 (3d ed. 1940) ; see also Annot., 94 A.L.R.
17, 30 (1935).
23. Speer's Eq. 48 (S.C. 1843).
24. Id. at 82; see also Shelley v. Shelley, 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964);
Smith v. Hcyward, 115 S.C. 145, 163, 105 S.E. 275, 281 (1920) ; Hall v. Hall, 2
McCord's Eq. 269 (S.C. 1827).
Vol. 17
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Reasons for the General Rule
It must be conceded that the very evidence which is excluded
by the rule as stated is the most pertinent to the determination
of what the testator meant by the words in his will. There are
several reasons for this exclusion. The hearsay rule is not one
of them.25 The basic reason for the exclusion of direct evidence
lies in the rule considered above, namely, that no extrinsic ut-
terance may compete with and overthrow the words of a docu-
ment which is the final embodiment of a transaction.26 The effect
of the rule is to deny any jural effect to such direct evidence,
even though it is the best evidence available in interpreting a
will. 
2 7
A second reason for the exclusion lies in the fact that the
requirements for the execution of a will are set out in statutes,2
and the direct statement of the testator's intent which does not
meet those requirements is necessarily excluded as an invalid
testamentary declaration. Page mentions the danger of perjury
as a third reason and relates it to the motive behind the passage
of the various statutes. 29
Application of the Rule
In general, the application of the rule is not difficult; it merely
prevents the introduction of the testator's oral and written in-
structions, or other declarations of intent, from being set up to
enlarge, overthrow or replace the words of the will. In short, it
excludes everything that would be excluded by the rule of inte-
gration.30 The difficulties arise only when the -various exceptions
are considered.3
25. Such declarations are admissible -under an exception to that rule. 6 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1725, 1735 (3d ed. 1940).
26. Rogers v. Rogers, 221 S.C. 360, 70 S.E2d 637 (1952) ; see also Bettis v.
Harrison, 186 S.C. 352, 195 S.E. 835 (1938); 95 C.J.S. Wills 591 (1957); 9
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2425 (3d ed. 1940). For a compilation of American juris-
dictions, see Annot., 94 A.L.R. 17, 257 (1935).
27. The effect of that rule is to deny any jural effect to such declarations.
When a transaction has been embodied in a single document, no other
utterance of intent or will on the same subject can be given jural effect.
Hence, such a declaration is excluded from consideration even in the
process of interpretation, not because it would not for that purpose be
useful, but because it would be improper for the other purpose.
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2471 (3d ed. 1940).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-295 (1962); § 19-206, Soldier's and Mariner's Wills;
§§ 19-291 to -294, Nuncupative Wills.
29. 4 PAGE, WILLS § 32.9 (3d ed. 1961).
30. 9 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 2471 (3d ed. 1940).
31. Ibid.
19651
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ExCETIoS To THE RULE THAT DRcT EviDENCE
IS NOT A mDMfSnLE
Exception for Equivocation
Direct evidence is, however, admissible to aid in the construc-
tion of a will where an equivocation exists. This term has caused
no little confusion, most of it due to vague definitions and un-
certain meanings of words used in the definitions. The first task,
then, is to define "equivocation" precisely in order that the
exception allowing direct evidence to be admitted will be lim-
ited to the correct situations.
A. Definition of equivocation. Webster defines equivocation
as an "ambiguity of speech; the use of words of a double signifi-
cance."13 2 This is a good general definition, but it is not so precise
as to be satisfactory for use in the legal field. Unfortunately,
there is disagreement among both the cases and the writers as
to the exact meaning of the word. The problem arises mainly
because of the choice of words used in the definitions rather
than because of lack of understanding.
Basically, there are two schools of thought. Those who follow
the strict rule define an equivocation as language applying ex-
actly to two or more persons or things.33 An example of this
would be a devise to Bob Wallace. If, on application of the lan-
guage of the will, it is found that two persons bearing the name
of Bob Wallace exist and could have been reasonably intended,
the will would contain an equivocation. The liberal view, on the
other hand, is adopted by those who define an equivocation as
language applying equally or partly to two or more persons or
things.3 4 An example of this would be a devise to "my cousin
John." Upon application of the language in the will, it is found
that the testator has a nephew, John, and a cousin, William. The
errant description does not fit either person exactly, but fits
them both equally and partly.
Page uses the words "precisely and equally" 35 to define an
equivocation, thus adopting the strict view. It is rather obvious
that the word "equally" is unnecessary, because if the description
fits both persons or things precisely, it follows that it must fit
them equally. Wigmore and Wigram present more of a problem
32. WEBSTER, UNABRIDGED DICTioNARY (2d ed. 1964).
33. 4 PAGE, WILLS § 32.9 (3d ed. 1961).
34. 4 PAGE, WILLS § 32.9 (3d ed. 1961); 9 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 2472 (3d
ed. 1940) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 242, comment j (1940).
35. 4 PAGE, WILLS § 32.9 (3d ed. 1961).
[Vol. 17
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than Page with regard to their stand on the issue. Wigmore de-
fines an equivocation as "a term which, upon application to
external objects, is bound to fit two or more of them equally."3 6
The word equally is defined as "of the same quantity, size, num-
ber, value, degree, intensity, etc."37 A description may fit two
things equally and exactly, but it may also fit them equally and
partially. This reasoning leads one to the conclusion that Wig-
more defines an equivocation from the liberal point of view.
That is, he recognizes that an equivocation exists when the de-
scription applies precisely and equally,38 but he feels that a
description which applies equally, but partially, to two things
should also constitute an equivocation. 9
Wigram presents another problem. He defines an equivocation
as "terms which are applicable indifferently to more than one
person or thing."40 Webster defines the word indifferently as,
"equally, impartially; without favor, prejudice or bias.141 This
definition brings Wigram within the scope of the logic relating
to Wigmore. This being the case, Wigram espouses the theory
that an equivocation occurs when the language of description
applies either equally and precisely or equally and partially.
Thus, the situation appears to be that Page adopts the strict
view and merely recognizes the liberal view, while Wigmore,
Wigram, and the RESTATE ENT OF PROPERT-y42 recognize both
and adopt the latter.
It is worthy of note that Wigmore comments that the rulings
on evidence do not differ from state to state except in exemplify-
ing one rule or the other.43
The latest case on the point in South Carolina is Shelley v.
Shelley,'4 which involved the construction of a will devising land
by the words "northern part" and "southern part." The court
treated the description as a latent ambiguity which applied to
two things equally. This is, as Mr. Justice Bussey pointed out,
an equivocation. The importance of this case is the fact that the
36. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2472 (3d ed. 1940).
37. WEBSTFR, UNABRIDGED DICtiONARY (2d ed. 1964).
38. 4 PAGE, WILLS § 32.9 (3d ed. 1961).
39. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2474 (3d ed. 1940).
40. Annot., 94 A.L.R. 17, 30 (1935), citing: WIGRAm, RuLs OF LAw IN
INTERPRETATION OF WILLS, 55 (3d ed. 1840).
41. WEBSTER, UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1964).
42. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 242, comment j (1940).
43. 9 WIGMzoR, EVIDENCE § 2472 (3d ed. 1940).
44. 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964).
1965]
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words applied precisely and equally to the two objects. Thus,
South Carolina does recognize the strict definition of an equivo-
cation. The real question is whether the liberal view is also
adopted. That is, does South Carolina allow an equivocation to
arise when the descriptive language in the will applies equally,
but only partially, to two or more persons or things? There has
been no case directly in point. The closest case is Ball v. Hall,45
where it was said:
[P]arol evidence has been admitted to explain latent am-
biguities, as in the case of two persons bearing the same
name. There, parol evidence has been received to explain
which of them was intended by the testator as the legatee.
And so parol evidence has been received, to prove what prop-
erty was intended when the testator was possessed of two
of the same description.
46
The significance of this language lies not in the statement of
the strict rule, but in the exclusion of the liberal rule. The court
was called upon to decide whether direct evidence of intent
could be admitted to strike a clause in the will. In resolving this
question, the court undertook to state when such evidence could
be admitted and failed to declare the liberal rule as constituting
such a situation. Beyond this, no South Carolina case has been
found which mentions the liberal definition, nor has a case been
found that admitted such evidence under the circumstances.
This, of course, does not preclude the adoption of the liberal rule
in the future.
B. Types of equivocation. There are two types of equivoca-
tion, patent and latent. The definitions of patent and latent
equivocations are respectively the same as those for patent and
latent ambiguities. An example of a latent equivocation would be
a devise in a will giving property to X. On its face, the will
shows no equivocation. If, however, upon the application of the
language in the will, it is found that there are two persons
named "X,"' the will would contain a latent equivocation. It is
latent because it does not appear on the face of the will but
arises only on the attempted application of the language in the
will. It is an equivocation because the descriptive language fits
two persons exactly.
45. 2 McCord's Eq. 269 (S.C. 1827).
46. Id. at 274-75.
[Vol. 17
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On the other hand, a patent equivocation does appear on the
face of the will. One of the best examples of such an equivocation
is found in ATKINSON ON Wns,4 7 as follows:
This doctrine has been applied even when the ambiguity
appeared on the face of the will. Thus, where a will con-
tained the legacy to "George Gord, the son of John Gord,"
and another to "George Gord, the son of George Gord," and
also a devise to "George Gord, the son of Gord," it was per-
missible to show testator's declarations as to which of the
Georges was intended as devisee.
48
C. Admissibility in cases of equivocation. While there is no
great difference in the admissibility of direct evidence according
to which definition is adopted by a particular jurisdiction,49
nevertheless, it is obvious that the number of situations in which
such evidence is allowed will be larger in a jurisdiction recog-
nizing the liberal view. Thus, given an equivocation, direct evi-
dence is admissible to assist in interpreting an equivocation. 0
The South Carolina cases on the subject are not numerous but
are in accord with the general statement of the exception. As
mentioned, in the Shelley case, the testator caused some con-
fusion by designating the division of a piece of land by the
words "northern part" and "southern part." This language was
treated as a latent equivocation. The court was correct in finding
an equivocation, but it appears to be patent rather than latent in
nature. What could be more patently equivocal than "northern
and southern part"? The northern part could start one inch
from the southern boundary and go north, and the southern part
could start one yard from the northern boundary and go south.
Regardless of the nature of the equivocation, the important point
is the language used by the court in admitting direct evidence of
the testator's intent.
5 '
47. ATKINSON, WiLLs § 60, at 287-88 (2d ed. 1953).
48. Id., citing: Gord v. Needs, 2 M.&W. 129, 150 Eng. Rep. 698 (1836) ; see
also Von Fell v. Spriling, 96 N.J. Eq. 20, 124 Atl. 518 (Ch. 1924). 34 YALE
L.J. 214. Cf. Chafee, Progress of the Law, 35 HARV. L. REv. 673, 679 (1922).
49. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2474 (3d ed. 1940).
50. Id.; see also People's Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. Harrison, 198 S.C. 457,
18 S.E.2d 1 (1932) ; Annot., 94 A.L.R. 17, 257 (1935).
51. [W]e think it well to point out that while declarations of intention on
the part of a testator are ordinarily excluded from consideration, they are,
nevertheless, according to the great weight of authority, receivable to
assist in interpreting an equivocation, or latent ambiguity.
Shelley v. Shelley, 244 S.C. 598, 606, 137 S.E.2d 851, 855 (1964).
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10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss2/5
SouTH CAuOmwA LAW REVIEw
Beckwith v. McAlister52 involved the attempted introduction
into evidence of a written memorandum between the testator and
a third party for the purpose of showing to whom the testator
meant to bequeath certain property. The contents of the agree-
ment were such that they indicated the intent directly,5 3 and the
court excluded the evidence on that ground.54
In re Robb's Estater5 seemingly contradicts the exception to
the general rule, but on closer examination it becomes apparent
that it does not. Robb involved a devise of land "to such persons
as would take under the laws of descent and distribution." The
testator was survived by no one who could take under the stat-
ute5G but was survived by an illegitimate sister. The court found
that the evidence of the testator's intent to pass the property to
his illegitimate sister was competent. It consisted of testimony
as to how he referred to his illegitimate "sister," and not what
he intended to give her or to whom he intended to devise any
part of his estate. Thus, the evidence was indirect, showed his
intention circumstantially and, therefore, was properly ad-
mitted. Had it been direct evidence, the court would have had
more difficulty in holding it admissible even in a case such as
this.
A case very much in point is Capps v. Richardson,57 involving
declarations of intention made both prior and subsequent to the
making of the will. These statements indicated that the testator
wished certain property to go to a nephew, notwithstanding the
terms of his will. The testimony was excluded by the trial judge
and his action was affirmed by the court on the ground that the
testimony "tends directly to alter, vary and contradict the lan-
guage of the will."58
52. 165 S.C. 1, 162 S.E. 623 (1932).
53. "Should said sum of $275.00 per year be promptly and fully paid when
due, then said Stelts hereby agrees he will allow the mortgages" given
by Mrs. Beckwith, "to run on and will not allow them to stand, and to
go to the parties provided for under his will hereinbefore mentioned."
Beckwith v. McAlister, 165 S.C. 1, 11, 162 S.E. 623, 627 (1932).
54. The agreement of March 23, 1916, between Mrs. Beckwith and Stelts,
having been executed after the will, and not being attested by three wit-
nesses, cannot be received as a testamentary paper or as showing the
interpretation to be placed on the will.
Id.; see also, Smith v. Heyward, 115 S.C. 145, 163, 105 S.E. 275, 281 (1920).
55. 37 S.C. 19, 16 S.E. 241 (1892).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-52 (1962).
57. 215 S.C. 34, 53 S.E. 876 (1949).
58. Id. at 878; see also Hall v. Hall, 2 McCord's Eq. 269 (S.C. 1827) ; Wish
v. Kershaw, reported in a note to Sherman v. Angel, Bailey's Eq. 351 (S.C.
1827).
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D. Equivocation and latent ambiguity. There has been some
confusion in the law regarding admissibility of direct evidence
in the case of a latent ambiguity which does not rise to the status
of a true equivocation (using either definition). This confusion
has resulted from language in the cases using the term "latent
ambiguity" as the equivalent of the term "equivocation" with
regard to the admissibility of direct evidence of intent For
example, Mr. Justice Bussey, in the Shelley case, said that "while
declarations of intention on the part of a testator are ordinarily
excluded from consideration," they may be "receivable to assist
in interpreting an equivocation, or latent ambiguity.""9 (Empha-
sis added).
Although a normal reading of the pertinent language tends
to indicate that direct evidence could come in to explain a latent
ambiguity of every type, such is not the case. There are an in-
finite number of possible latent ambiguities; the types are as
variable as the number of wills executed. On the other hand,
there are few cases of true equivocation, and the exception was
directed toward allowing the admission of direct evidence of
intent only in the latter case. This is indicated by the following
excerpt from the Hall case.
In other cases parol evidence has been admitted to explain
latent ambiguities, as in the case of two persons bearing the
same name. There, parol evidence has been received to ex-
plain which of them was intended by the testator as the
legatee. And so parol evidence has been received, to prove
what property was intended when the testator was possessed
of two of the same description. All these cases are however
treading on dangerous grounds.60 (Emphasis added).
As can be seen from the language used, the use of direct evi-
dence of intent is limited to cases that involve an equivocation.
The possibility of admitting such evidence in all cases of mere
latent ambiguity is further negated by the statement of the court
to the effect that to allow it in cases of true equivocations is dan-
gerous, thus implying that to attempt to admit it in all cases
of mere latent ambiguity would be so dangerous as to be beyond
question.
Also in support of the view of limiting the use of direct evi-
dence to cases of equivocation only is the New Jersey case of
59. Shelley v. Shelley, 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964).
60. 2 McCord's Eq. 269, 274-75 (S.C. 1827).
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Griscom v. Evens.61 There the court was faced with the problem
of direct evidence and resolved the problem as follows:
The only exception to this legal rule is that declarations of
the testator may be resorted to in cases of a latent ambiguity,
which arises where there are two or more persons or things
each answering exactly to the person or thing described in
the will. In such an event, parol evidence of what the testa-
tor said may be lawfully adduced to show which of them
he intended .... 12 (Emphasis added).
The important language in the above quotation, for the pur-
pose of this discussion, consists of the words "in such an event."
The use of the singular form indicates that there is one, and
only one, instance in which direct evidence of intent may be
introduced-that of an equivocation.
The South Carolina position as to whether direct evidence of
intent is admissible in all cases of latent ambiguity or only in
the case of an equivocation is unclear to the extent that the
specific question has never been decided. However, the language
of the Hall case seems to give an adequate indication that direct
evidence may be admitted only where there exists a true equivo-
cation. This conclusion is also indicated by the fact that no
South Carolina case so much as mentions the possibility of al-
lowing direct evidence to be admitted in such a situation.
It is worthy of note that direct evidence is not admissible to
show the character or quantum of the estate intended to be
devised even in the case of an equivocation.63 The rule is such
because the nature or extent of the estate devised is determined
by the legal effect of the words used to make the gift, and "this
question must be determined by the process of construction ac-
cording to established legal principles."64
Other Exceptions
Wigmore states that there are two further exceptions to the
rule that declarations of the testator are not admissible in cases
61. 40 N.J.L. 402, 29 Am. Rep. 251 (Sup. Ct 1878), aff'd, 42 NJ.L. 579, 36
Am. Rep. 542 (Ct. Err. & App. 1880); see also Annot., 94 A.L.R. 17, 267-68
(1935).
62. Griscom v. Evens, 40 N.J.L. 402, 407, 29 Am. Rep. 251, 253 (Sup. Ct.
1878), aff'd, 42 N.J.L. 579, 36 Am. Rep. 542 (Ct. Err. & App. 1880).
63. Annot, 94 A.L.R. 17, 269 (1935); no South Carolina cases cited.
64. Ibid.
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involving the construction of an ambiguous will.65 The first of
these is the exception for erroneous description. 6 Wigmore dis-
cusses the existence of this exception in the light of two cases,
Miller v. Traver 67 and Doe v. HisCocks,68 and comes to the con-
clusion that such an exception does exist, at least in England.
With regard to its existence in the United States, he concludes
that there is no firm rule established, but adds that there is no
reason why an exception should not be recognized.0 9 According
to Wigmore, the exception arises when "the description applies
in part only to each object." 70 A close reading of this language
indicates that this definition is nothing more than the liberal
definition of an equivocation. As this is the case, no additional
exception exists at all as Wigmore already adopts the liberal
definition of an equivocation which is the subject matter of the
first exception discussed above.
The next exception involves the rebutting of an equity (leg-
acies, advancements and pretermitted heirs). Generally, this ex-
ception operates "wherever in the interpretation of a will, a
certain term of legal effect is implied by a general rule of law
(and not as a matter of inference from the specific words or
phrases of a particular will). *71
Wigmore relates this language variously to the appointment
of an executor ;72 "the counter-presumption that a specific legacy
to the executor negatives the implication of a bequest of the
residue; "173 and the case of statutes requiring "that a child's
intestate share be distributed to him, in spite of a testamentary
disposal to other persons, unless it is made to appear that the
child was 'intentionally omitted' from the will."1
4
FALSA DEmoxNSAmo NoN NocmT5
We come now to a case of simple mis-description. This is to
be carefully distinguished from the situation where the lan-
65. 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2474, 2475 (3d ed. 1940).
66. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2474 (3d ed. 1940).
67. Cited in 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2474 (3d ed. 1940)
68. Ibid.
69. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2474 (3d ed. 1940).
70. Ibid.
71. 9 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2475 (3d ed. 1940).
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. .... a false description does not vitiate a document" ATINSON, WILLs
§ 60, at 283 (2d ed. 1953).
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guage is applicable to two or more items. Here, we are dealing
with words which are in part correct and are in part incorrect,
but the incorrect part is not applicable to any other particular
object. An example would be a devise of "my seven houses on
Hampton Street," when in fact the testator had eight houses on
Hampton Street. The court would reject the word "seven" as a
matter of mis-description.70
The immediate question at hand, however, is whether or not
direct evidence of intent is admissible. "All courts recognize the
doctrine though there is some doubt as to the exact situations
in which it will be employed. While it is generally agreed that
the court may put itself into the situation of the testator to
discover his intention, circumstantially the testator's direct decla-
rations of intention are not admissible."177 This seems to conclude
the matter, but Wigmore maintains that, while direct evidence
is not admissible in the case of a mere mis-description, it is ad-
missible when the correct words constitute an equivocation.7
South Carolina follows the general rule. In McOall v. McCall,
which was decided on the basis of falsa demonstratio, the court
said:
[T]he bequest being of [N]egroes, there is enough of cer-
tainty in that description to sustain the gift, notwithstand-
ing the partial mis-description arising from the misnomer.
A description false in part may be sufficiently certain by
references to extrinsic circumstances, to identify the subject
intended; as where a false description is superadded to one
which by itself is correct and adequate.7 9
Of course, if the superadded portion of the description is ap-
plicable to a particular person or object, you move from the area
of simple mis-description into the area of equivocation, and, in
the latter instance, direct evidence is admissible.
A BrAlqK AS Aiq EQwivOcATION
This area is troublesome when related to the admission of
direct evidence of intent. The general rule is that no evidence
76. ATKINSON, WILLS § 60, at 283 (2d ed. 1953), citing: Moore v. Moore,
1 Ir.R. 232 (1920) ; but cf. Mann v. Land, 177 Va. 509, 14 S.E.2d 341 (1941).
77. ATKINSON, WILLS § 60, at 283 (2d ed. 1953); citing: Haddox v. Jordan,
37 Ohio App. 209, 173 N.E. 11 (1930); Parsons v. Fitchett, 148 Va. 322, 138
S.E. 491 (1937).
78. 9 WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 2473 (2) (3) (4) (3d ed. 1940).
79. 4 Rich. Eq. 447, 456-57 (S.C. 1852).
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may come in to supply a blank in a will.8° South Carolina fol-
lows this general rule. The cases are not numerous but the law
is clear. The court, in Roseborough v. Hemphill,8' went into the
problem in detail, but the statement made in MacDonald v.
Fagan8 2 disposes of the matter quite well. There the court simply
said: "it is too clear for anyone to doubt that the courts have
no power to supply the omission.1
8 3
Although the law is clear, direct evidence could be admitted
if the blank was such that it created an equivocation. 4 Bear in
mind that the court could not fill the blank by the use of direct
evidence, but it could be determined to whom the testator meant
to give his estate by the use of direct evidence.
With regard to South Carolina law, the present situation is
as follows. The general rule is that extrinsic evidence cannot be
introduced as an aid to the interpretation of a will when no
ambiguity appears. If, however, there is a patent or latent am-
biguity in the will, indirect evidence of intent may be intro-
duced to explain the words used by the testator in his will. In
such a case, direct evidence of intent is excluded. WVhen the
patent or latent ambiguity rises to the status of an equivocation,
which is defined as occurring only when descriptive words apply
precisely and equally to two or more persons or things, direct
evidence of intent is admissible. Direct evidence is never admis-
sible to explain the nature or extent of an estate granted by a
will and is not admissible in a case of simple mis-description
unless the applicable words constitute an equivocation. A blank
space may not be clarified by direct evidence in South Carolina.
ROBERT W. DmBix, JR.
80. Hunt v. Hort, 3 Bro.Ch.Cas. 311, 313, 29 Eng. Rep. 554 (Ch. 1791);
Rosborough v. Hemphill, 5 Rich. Eq. 95, 108 (S.C. 1852).
81. 5 Rich. Eq. 95, 108 (S.C. 1852).
82. 118 S.C. 510, 111 S.E. 793 (1922).
83. Id. at 523, 111 S.E. at 796.
84. Is a blank space an equivocation? It certainly fits two or more objects
equally; and where it represents merely an insufficient term in an at-
tempted description it may be treated as an equivocation; because the
writer has fixed upon an object, but his words do not carry the descrip-
tion far enough. On the other hand, where a blank space represents a
failure to make a final expression of will, the act is incomplete; to supply
declarations of intention would be to set up a rival will; there can be no
interpretation, for there is nothing to interpret. It therefore depends on
the particular document whether a blank space is an equivocation.
9 Wi oRa, EVIDENcrCE §2473 (3d ed. 1940).
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